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Abstract 
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing number of claims through investor state dispute settle-
ment (ISDS) proposed by foreign investors to the host states. This has prompted some states review 
their international investment agreements (IIA) and their ISDS clauses. Indonesia has terminated 
many of its Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) as well. The problem will discuss are the urgency of 
IIA and ISDS for Indonesia, and what kind of IIA and ISDS format that Indonesia should make to 
balance the state’s and foreign investor’s interest. The analysis results conclude that the existence 
of IIA and ISDS remains urgent for Indonesia, but it takes changes in terms of format like the new 
models made by many other host states. They involve redefinition of multi-interpretative terms and 
the exhaustion of local remedies. In addition, the non-automatic and mutual agreement ISDS 
arbitration which excludes the MFN clause should also provide the state's flexibility to protect the 
people’s prosperity through non-discriminating regulations. 
 
Keywords:  international investation agreement; investor-state investment dispute; foreign invest-
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Abstrak 
 
Beberapa  tahun belakangan ini terjadi lonjakan gugatan di forum investor state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) yang diajukan investor asing kepada host state. Hal ini memicu banyak  negara meninjau ulang 
perjanjian investasi internasional(PII)-nya berikut klausul ISDS-nya. Indonesiapun melakukan penga-
khiran banyak Bilateral investment Treaty-nya. Rumusan masalah adalah Bagaimana urgensi PII dan 
ISDS bagi Indonesia? Format PII dan ISDS seperti apakah yang seharusnya dibuat Indonesia untuk men-
jaga keseimbangan perlindungan kepentingan negara dengan kepentingan investor asing? Hasil Analisa 
menyimpulkan bahwa Keberadaan PII dan ISDS tetap urgen bagi Indonesia, namun dengan perubahan 
format yang dapat merujuk model baru yang dibuat banyak host state lain seperti pendefini-sian 
ulang istilah yang multi tafsir, kewajiban exhaustion of local remedies; Penunjukan arbitrase ISDS de-
ngan kesepakatan Bersama, tidak memasukkan klausul MFN, juga memberikan fleksibilitas negara un-
tuk melindungi kesejahteraan masyarakatnya melalui peraturan yang tidak diskriminatif.  
 
Kata kunci: perjanjian investasi internasional, investor-state investment dispute, investasi asing 
 
 
Introduction 
During 2011-2016, the number of claims 
through Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
mechanism encountered by Indonesian govern-
ment increased. It can be seen in the table year 
1920-2009 (19 years) there were only 6 cases 
whereas during 2011-2016 (5 years) 5 cases 
were found. Several recorded cases were Ravat 
Ali Rizvi case, Churchill Mining and Planet Mi-
ning case, Newmont Nusantara BV case,  Indian 
Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd (IMFA) case, and 
Oleovest Pte. Ltd case. 
 
Table 1. The cases investigated through the 
Investor State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) 
Year International Arbitration Cases 
1990 Amco Asia Corporation v RI 
1999 Himpurna California Energy Ltd. V PT. 
PLN 
1999 Patuha Prower Ltd. V. PT. PLN 
2000 Karaha Bodas LLC v. PT. Pertami-na and 
PT. PLN 
2007 Cemex Asia Holding Ltd. V RI 
2009 PT. Newmont Nusa Tenggara v RI 
2009 Pemprov Kaltim v PT. Kaltim Pri-ma 
Coal 
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2011 Rafat Ali Rizvi v RI 
2011 Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v RI 
2012 Churchill Mining and Planet Mi-ning Pty 
Ltd. V RI 
2015 Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd. 
(IMFA) v RI 
2016 Oleovest Ltd. V RI 
 
It only happens in Indonesia. Generally, 
there is increasing number of claims toward the 
host states through ISDS mechanism.1 The 
claims value is bombastic and the claim mate-
rial is a state policy to protect public basic prin-
ciples which creates a suggestion for Indonesia 
government to disagree the ISDS mechanism in 
any International Investment Agreement (IIA), 
even to withdraw from the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Dispures (ICSID).2 
According to Susan D. Frank, there is a legiti-
macy crisis in ISDS by some inconsistent deci-
sions.3 The matter above results in termination 
and review of several International Investment 
Agreement (IIA) especially Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) in Indonesia.4  
Below is official report by BPKM (Indones-
ia Investment Coordinating Board) in 2013-2016. 
There were 67 BIT. In detail, there were 20 un-
justified BIT, terminated 25 BIT, and the rest 22 
are still applied and reviewed for its sustainabil-
ity.5 The first BIT stopped was the BIT with 
Dutch that were effectively applied since 1 July 
2015. 
The government policy to terminate and 
review the BIT gains many supports. It is be-
cause the more commitment numbers in IIA, the 
more potentials to be claimed in ISDS. It might 
                                                          
1  James D. Fry, Odysseas G. Repousis, “Towards a new 
World for Investor -State Arbitration Through Transpar-
ency,”, N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol., Vol. 48 No. 795, spring 
2016, p. 801. 
2  Hikmahanto J, “Indonesia Should Withdraw from the 
ICSID!”, The Jakarta Post, 2 April 2014. 
3  Susan D. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions”, Fordham L. Rev. Vol. 
75 Isuue 4, 2005, p. 1522. 
4  Yacob Rihwanto, “Bilateral Investment Treaties dan Pe-
nyelesaian ArbritaseInternasional (Studi Kasus Pencabut-
an Izin Kuasa Pertambangan Churchill Mining)”, Lex Re-
naissance, No. 1 Vol. 1, January 2016, p. 109. 
5  Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal, “Perkembangan 
Perjanjian Peningkatan dan Perlindungan Penanaman 
Modal (P4M) dan Prioritas Penyelesaian P4M antara In-
donesia–Negara Mitra”, Paper-materi presentasi invest 
in remarkable Indonesia , Jakarta, July 19th 2016, p. 3. 
occur when the policy to protect national 
interest is considered inappropriate with the ag-
reed Indonesian commitment in IIA. 
Figure 1.  Official report by Indonesia Invest-
ment Coordinating Board in 2013-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, IIA existence and its ISDS 
clause is still believed as an urgent matter to 
attract foreign investment. It is because Indo-
nesia still have limited capital, technology and 
human resources to conduct national develop-
ment. Hence, this article will discuss: what is 
the urgency of IIA and ISDS for Indonesia?; And 
what kind of IIA and ISDS model Indonesia 
should make to keep state interest protection 
and foreign investor interest balance? 
 
Discussion 
IIA and ISDS Urgency for Indonesia 
IIA gained its popularity after the World 
War II. At that time, the IIA aimed to give pro-
tection guarantee from nationalization and dis-
crimination by the host state especially new in-
dependent state.6 The first IIA was German – 
Pakistan BIT in 1959. Then many European and 
American states followed to make BIT with 
developing country as the place to set the in-
vestment. In this era, the protection was less 
                                                          
6  Howard Mann, “Reconceptualizing International Invest-
ment Law: Its Role In Sustainable Development”, Lewis 
& Clark Law Review, Vol. 17 No. 2, summer 2106, p.14.   
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and ISDS mechanism had not yet known.7 ICSID 
convention in 1965 became the foundation of 
ISDS emergence. In ‘90s until 2007, the number 
of IIA increased significantly, not only bilateral 
but also regional and multilateral such as Asean 
Comprehensive Investments Agreement (ACIA), 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (CEPA), Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In 
addition, other multilateral agreements are 
TRIMs, North American Free Trade Area (NAF-
TA, 1992, and APEC Non-Binding Investment 
Principles (1994) 8 
IIA contains minimum standards of invest-
ment protection which must be given by the 
host state:9 first, an equal and fair treatment or 
a treatment with no discrimination from any in-
vestment types whether it is domestic or for-
eign; second, a full protection and security con-
taining state obligation to give compensation 
upon the corporation loss due to war, armed 
conflict, revolution, state emergency, riot or 
rebellion. This protection is usually in form of 
compensation or recovery; third, a protection 
from any action or nationalization and an oblig-
ation to give compensation; fourth, mechanism 
of dispute settlement which aligns the investor 
and the state level known as “Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS). 
ISDS is minimum standard which must ex-
ist in IIA. ISDS is not an agreement which is dir-
ectly made between host state and investor. 
Instead, it is made by home state with the host 
state embodied in IIA.10 ISDS aims to be an ef-
fective mechanism of dispute settlement that 
                                                          
7  Ibid  
8  Eka Husnul Hidayati, et.al. “Akibat Penghentian Bilate-
ral Investment Treaty (BIT) Indonesia-Belanda yang dila-
kukan secara sepihak oleh Indonesia”, USU Law Journal, 
Vol. 5 No. 2, April 2017, p.138. 
9  Rachmi Hertanti and Rika Febriani, 2014, Bilateral In-
vestment treaty (BITs) Negara VS Korporasi, Seri Buku 
Panduan Memahami BITs: Perjanjian Perlindungan In-
vestasi Internasional dan Gugatan Investor Melawan 
Indonesia”,  Jakarta: Indonesia for Global Justice, p. 5. 
10  Rachel wellhausen, “Recend Trends in Investor State 
Dispute Settlement”, Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement, University of Texas in Austin, December 
2015, p.2 
does not cause any conflict between the sta-
tes.11  
However, ISDS is perceived to undermine 
the democratic norm, violate personal rights 
and public rights that develop in domestic con-
text, and destroy the state sovereignty. Ac-
cording to this party, the domestic court should 
be the proper institution to rule the public, en-
vironmental, security, safety and social inter-
ests rather than ISDS court.12  
This reminds us of the Calvo doctrine in 
19th century which prioritizes the host state 
sovereignty and refuses the home state inter-
vention in dispute settlement between investor 
with host state.13 Another criticism to ISDS is 
the risk of many claims proposed by investor to 
the host state with its value reaching out US $ 1 
billion. Besides, the case high expense can be 
charged to host state even in case of their win-
ning. 
Furthermore, there has been a perception 
that ISDS is the determinant factor of the Fo-
reign direct investment (FDI) entry. Neverthe-
less, some research show different result that it 
is not.14 The increased policy transparency, 
market access, removal of Investment Negative 
List, license simplification, and regulation cer-
tainty are considered more important. ISDS is 
not the initial determinant of important invest-
ment, but it becomes important as the last at-
tempt if the relation between states gets wor-
se.15 
The criticism toward ISDS is getting wider 
since the withdrawal of several South American 
countries such as Bolivia, Equador and Vene-
zuela from ICSID forum. It is a reaction of many 
                                                          
11  Martina A. Weiss, et. al, 2015, International Investment 
Agreement (IIAS), Washington: Congressional Research 
Service, p. 22. 
12  Effrey T. Cook, “The Evolution of Investment-State Dis-
pute Resolution in NAFTA and CAFTA; Wild West to 
World Order”, Pepp. L. Rev., Vol. 34 Issue 4, 2007, 
p.1089 
13  Ibid 
14  J.W Yackee, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative 
Evidence”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 
51, 2010, p. 114.  
15  Michael Nolan, “Challenge to the Credibility of the In-
vestor state arbitration system”, Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 
Vol. 5 No. 429, 2015, p. 432. 
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claims toward their policies conducted by the 
investor in ICSID forum.16 
It is inferred from the explanation above 
that indeed there are many pros and cons 
towards the IIA and ISDS existence for the host 
state. Yet as long as Indonesia is still in need of 
foreign capital then the IIA and ISDS existence is 
still urgent, in the context of Indonesia. The 
other Indonesia’s competitor states that also 
need the foreign investment are facilitating or 
providing IIA and ISDS as well. IIA and ISDS are 
the instrument of international law which tied 
two parties up, either the investor or the state. 
The IIA and ISDS existence secure the foreign 
investor since they will obtain the protection 
assurance of their investment in Indonesia from 
the arbitrary nationalization action, discrimina-
tion, and other unfair treatments. Even so, IIA 
and ISDS need a particular format, not like the 
current one that is investor-biased and disad-
vantaging Indonesian business. Even Indonesian 
investors abroad also need such protection gua-
rantee from their host states. 
 
The Model of IIA and ISDS for Indonesia 
Indonesian action in terminating and re-
viewing IIA and ISDS is already precise. World’s 
trend also shows the same causes. Many states 
have modified their IIA to protect more their 
host state’s sovereignty comprehensively, to 
minimize the misuse the ISDS risk and to give 
more state’s autonomy in pursuing its people 
prosperity.17 Several new IIA models done by 
some host states can be a reference to arrange 
the new IIA and ISDS format of for Indonesia.  
The first model is India. India’s action in 
revising their BIT is triggered by their defeat in 
a case of White Industries Australia Limited v. 
Republic of India, in UNCITRAL forum. The In-
dia’s new BIT model is redefining the definition 
of investment, investor and enterprise based on 
                                                          
16  Christoph Schreuer, “Denunciation of the ICSID Conven-
tion and Consent to Arbitration”, in Michael Waibel, Et. 
All. (eds), The Backlash againt Investment Arbitration, 
Kluwer Law International, March 2010 The Backlash 
against Investment Arbitration, p. 354,  
17  Nikesh Patel, “An Emerging Trend in International Tra-
de: A shift to safeguard against ISDS abuses and pro-tect 
host state sovereignty”, Minnesota Journal of Interna-
tional Law, Minn. J. Int'l L. Vol. 26 No. 273, winter 
2017, p. 273 
the investment law applied in India, as well as 
obliging investor using the exhaustion of local 
remedies at least 5 years before using ISDS.18  
Local remedies doctrine was known in 
1970s-1980s, but then it was forgotten. An ar-
bitration clause like ICSID is interpreted as an 
obligation dismantling of local remedies. A few 
part of IIA is still required obligation of exhaust-
tion local remedies by approximately 18 months 
of time limitation.19 It is actually unfair if we 
look on how in ISDS, the solving of such case 
takes more than 4 years in average.20 The bene-
fit gained by obliging the exhaustion of local 
remedies employment in IIA is to push the na-
tional law to improve the law system and its 
justice; to ease ISDS in giving qualified decision 
because arbitrary ISDS can learn the national 
law through national court’s decision; to set the 
investor equally to the citizen, without any 
privilege; and to help clarify as well as integ-
rate the role of domestic court and ISDS arbitra-
tion. 
India’s new BIT model does not contain 
MFN conditions. In addition, it forbids treaty 
shopping as well. Although this model is more 
host-state friendly, it still provides investor’s 
protection. India is still actively integrating with 
the global economy and negotiating IIA which 
gives India autonomy and protection towards 
the claims potentials through ISDS21  
The second IIA model is given by Canada 
which was triggered by the case of Lone Pine 
Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada. 
Canada was prosecuted by Lone Pine Resources 
because An Act to limit oil and gas activities 
launched by Quebec. The licenses of explora-
tion in St. Lawrence River was called off in-
cluding Lone Pine Resources’ license.22 The 
Quebec’s action was intended to protect the 
environment around the river.23 In response to 
this case, Canada stated that this action was le-
gally a sovereign state action without any dis-
crimination. It aims to protect St. Lawrence Ri-
                                                          
18  Ibid. 
19  Matthew C. Porterfield, 2015, “Exhaustion of Local Re-
medies in Investor State Dispute Settlement: An Idea 
Whose Time has Come, Yale J. Intl. L. Online, Vol. 41 
No. 1, fall 2015, p. 4. 
20  Ibid, p. 11. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid.  
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ver and cannot be considered as an arbitration, 
unfair or inequitable measure.24  
In 2015, IIA of Canada and the European 
Commission (CETA) gave a flexibility to make le-
gitimate policy, recognition on the importance 
of international security, democracy, and hu-
man right in order to improve the trading and 
international economy cooperation. CETA made 
sure that investor’s protection must not ignore 
the importance of protecting country’s sover-
eignty.25  
The third model is what Australia has. 
Similarly to Canada’s case, Australia was prose-
cuted by Phillip Morris to UNCITRAL because 
their Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 was con-
sidered violating the regulation on Article 2 (2) 
and Article 6 on the Hong Kong-Australia Bila-
teral Investment Treaty (1993)26 about “fair and 
equitable treatment” and the indirect expropri-
ation of investments without adequate compen-
sation. Australia refused all prosecution from 
Phillip Morris and stated that the purpose of 
The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 was to 
protect people’s health. Although they won, 
Australia still launched more than fifty million 
dollars for the court fee.27 Learning from this 
case, CHAFTA tried to make several changes on 
IIA and ISDS process in their will to protect host 
state’s right in arranging society’s prosperity le-
gitimately through non-discriminating regulati-
on.  
The Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia ca-
se inspired and influenced the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) arrangement. In this case, al-
though there are still many controversies which 
make many parties shout to many states to not 
take parts in this agreement, TPP has done se-
veral changes related to the direct expropria-
tion and indirect expropriation definetion, espe-
cially related to state’s right to protect public 
interests.28 
The new BIT model is also set by New 
Zealand that made IIA without ISDS clause. It 
aims to decrease the investor’s claim risk to 
                                                          
24   Nikesh Patel, op.cit,  p. 290. 
25  Ibid, p. 292. 
26  Michael Nolan, “Challenge to the Credibility of the In-
vestor state arbitration system”, Am. U. Bus. L. Rev., 
Vol. 5 No. 429, 2015, p.430 
27  Nikesh Patel, op.cit., p. 296. 
28  Ibid  
ISDS. For New Zealand, the litigation risk can be 
managed through substantive conditions in the 
investment agreement.29 Even so, this practice 
got many criticism because the state’s commit-
ment in IIA without containing ISDS is doubted. 
How it is possible for IIA to promise the investor 
mutually substantive treatment without giving 
them rights to access international arbitration. 
It is the same as not providing law protection 
from host state’s behavior which might be op-
portunistic.30 
The alternative offered by the author is 
by fixing the BIT by improving ISDS clause which 
is not automatically applied. Yet, it is going to 
be determined later in a separated arbitration 
agreement after the dispute appears based on 
all parties’ deal. Besides, in Indonesia’s new BIT 
model, it is going to be better if the exhaustion 
local remedies is applied 5 years before it is 
brought to ICSID forum. This aims to give a 
chance for Indonesian court to handle it. 
 
Conclusion 
The IIA and ISDS existence is still urgent 
for Indonesia due to the need of foreign invest-
ment related to the limit of Indonesian capabili-
ty in the terms of capital, technology, and hu-
man resources. IIA and ISDS are going to give 
protection guarantee, law certainty and justice 
to the investor. The current IIA and ISDS need 
reformulation which gives balance towards host 
state’s interest as well as investor’s personal 
interest. 
Indonesia’s new IIA and ISDS model can 
refer to similar the other host states’ instru-
ment, especially India, as the same developing 
countries. Indonesia’s new BIT should reformu-
late the terms which are given a very open 
definition and can be interpreted widely this 
whole time, as well as applying obligation of ex-
haustion of local remedies. Furthermore, the 
pointing of ISDS arbitration must be taken with 
mutual consent (not automatically), no fake 
MFN clauses, and give host state nation‘s flex-
                                                          
29  Amokura Kawharu, Luke Nottage, “Models for Invest-
ment Treaties in the Asia Pacific region: An Underview”, 
Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L., Vol. 34 No. 461, 2017, p. 477. 
30  Jason Webb Yackee, 2 “Do States Bragain over Investor 
State Dispute Settlement? Or Toward Greater Colabora-
tion in the Study of Biateral Investment Treaties”, Santa 
Clara J. Int'l L., Vol. 12 No. 277, 2013, p. 287. 
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ibility to protect the society’s prosperity 
through non-discriminating regulations to get 
society’s prosperity, health, safety, environ-
ment, public moral, and public order. Indonesia 
needs to review and make a new IIA and ISDS 
format model which balances the investor’s and 
host state’s interests.  
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